- give the French the impression in any way that they are acting for the DRV.
- According to Thong, if it were possible for a peace to be achieved and a new government formed, Ho Chi Minh would participate. There would be no question of his subsequently attempting a coup d'etat, because orthodox Communists whose orientation is strictly Moscow-inspired, are a very small minority in the government. The trouble with achieving peace in the first place is that the mediators, the Indians, have deservedly earned a reputation for complete diplomatic inefficiency.
- On 17 October 1951, Pham Huy Thong discussed the peace question with Aslan Humbaraci, ex-Turkish Communist, and the editor of Mondes d'Orient, in Paris. Thong stated that earlier in the year he had talked with a senior Indian civil service representative visiting France, who had promised to put the matter forward in Delhi, but had apparently taken no action. Now the DRV are not

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sanxious to make a direct approach to the Indians since they do not want it known that they are prepared to be the instigators of a peace offer. It was therefore agreed between Thong and Humaraci that the latter address letters to Pendit Nehru, Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in Peiping, and Radha Krishna, Indian Ambassador in Moscow, known to the editor. The editor is to forward these letters via the Indian diplomatic pouch, requesting the Indian Press Attache, with whom he is friendly, to send them on to the addressees.

It was also agreed that Claude Bourdet, editor of Observateur, be approached to use his influence in French Government circles to persuade them to approach the Indians and ask them to act as mediators. This the editor intends to do on Monday, 22 October 1951.

## POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF DRV.

- The DRV contains a very small percentage of Stalinists. This is even true of the immediate advisers of Ho Chi Minh. This situation is reflected in the make-up of the DRV group in France, where some of the most trusted members, such as the journalist Le Than Khoi, are not Communist in the orthodox sense, nor Stalinist.
- 7. This minority of Stalinists, however, forms the nucleus of a movement which has attracted all kinds of left-wing nationalists in Indochina, because only the USSR has appeared to be in favor of the national independence of the Vietnamese people.
- 8. While sometimes disagreeing with the policy instructions which arrive from Ho Chi Minh's headquarters, the Paris group submit themselves entirely to them, voluntarily stifling their criticism. They point out that the DRV in Indochina is at war and that it must receive complete support and obedience, even if the intransigeant policy which a war situation encourages appears exaggerated when seen from Paris.
- 9. It is the state of war which ties the DRV closely to Moscow. The real Communists in the DRV have to make concessions to placate the non-Stalinist majority but these concessions at present are slight, for the war can only be prosecuted with the support of the USSR and Communist China. The non-Communist supporters of the DRV, realizing this, accommodate themselves accordingly. Nevertheless, as the non-Communist nationalist element is strong, policy compromises are frequent in order that no section should be estranged.
- The majority of the DRV members, being non-Stalinist, are becoming restless for peace. They feel that the DRV cwes too much to the USSR already, and this may give an excuse for domination of the future Vietnam state by the Soviets. They also wish to avoid intervention of Chinese Communist troops in the Indo-chinese war, and for this reason would like to come to terms with their adversaries. Rather than see this, the majority would like to compromise in a coalition government, achieve peace, and develop a peacetime economic and social policy.
- The majority in the DRV agree to the constant concessions made to Moscow and the Stalinists as an expediency of war, but are anxious to end this as quickly as possible.

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Comment. Pham Huy Thong lives in Paris at 118 Boulevard Diderot. He appears to be in his early twenties, but is probably about 40 years of age. He is very short, his face shows no wrinkles, and he wears spectacles. Until recently, he worked at the Institut des Recherches Scientifiques, but gave this up in order to devote himself to DRV activities. He speaks good French. He has substantial funds, but lives in miserable conditions with his wife and at least two children (boys). He is, or was, a Christian; at present a Communist, but he does not appear to be a sectarian Marxist. He has a plate with his name on the door and corresponds openly, although he states that he is under French surveillance. He seems to have no fear of the French authorities, although he severed contact in early 1951 for a period with other DRV supporters because of French police interest in him. He produces a bulletin Vietnam Information and is in correspondence with DRV headquarters in Indochina via the USSR. He is also able to obtain press material from DRV representatives in Moscow and Prague. He refers to Indochina for policy and instructions and constantly exchanges correspondence, although the method is slow. The original Vietnam Information is sent to him from behind the Iron Curtain. He translates it into French, produces a typewritten French edition, and has it circulated by hand by DRV supporters.

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